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OF PROTEST IN RURAL 
RUSSIA
Oane Visser
Oane Visser. Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud 
University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. o.visser@
maw.ru.nl. The article beneﬁ ted from valuable comments by Olessia Kirtchik, Mischa 
Gabowitsch, and two anonymous reviewers.
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses property reforms in the postcommunist countryside 
(focusing on Russian policies, which have been the most “progressive” among the 
dominant economies of the former Soviet Union) and analyzes why they have hardly 
stimulated capital formation and empowerment among the rural population so far, 
compared with rural developments in Argentina that are discussed by Bidaseca in her 
paper in this issue.
A comparison between the post-communist countries and Latin America is 
interesting for an understanding of land reforms. On the one hand, the agrarian 
history of these areas is very different, with 70 years of collective agriculture in the 
communist system of the former Soviet Union, and much shorter and more limited 
state intervention in Latin American agriculture. During the heyday of state 
intervention in the Latin American countryside in the 1970s, widespread collective 
and public arrangements in credits and marketing existed, but production mostly 
remained in private hands (with the exception of some socialist states like Nicaragua). 
On the other hand, the postsocialist privatization in the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
and Eastern Europe can be seen as a chapter in a much bigger book of neoliberal 
reforms which have been taking place notably in Latin America, but also in Asia and 
Africa, since the 1980s and 90s. Privatization in the FSU, although unique in its scale 
and speed, was part and parcel of a larger neoliberal package that also had a strong 
impact on Latin America, and which included trade liberalization, the reduction or 
phasing out of price supports, cheap credits, and marketing institutions, not to speak 
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of reductions in other rural development and welfare policies (see e.g. Bryceson et 
al. 2000).
These policies, although in principle advocating individual entrepreneurship 
and empowerment, seem predominantly to have favored the large-scale agribusinesses, 
at the cost of small-scale producers. In Russia, after a short-lived increase in the 
number of private family farms in the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s, this segment has been 
characterized by stagnation in terms of the number of farms, and rather insigniﬁ cant 
growth in production. Furthermore, the ownership of the large farm enterprises 
(LFEs), the former kolkhozes and sovkhozes (collective and state farm enterprises, 
respectively), which became the property of their employees through the egalitarian 
distribution of shares, has increasingly become concentrated in the hands of the 
rural (or even urban) elite. This accumulation of land and other assets by the elites 
has turned rural dwellers, who became landowners only in the 1990s, back into 
(almost landless) farm workers. However, as this article will show, this accumulation 
has gone almost unchallenged by any form of collective protest. The central question 
that will be addressed is this: Why does a peasant movement, potentially in coalition 
with other groups, not exist in Russia?
To answer this central question, this article will investigate the notable absence 
of a peasant resistance alongside two other crucial topics. These are, ﬁ rstly, the 
various forms of accumulation of land and other assets by the elite, and secondly the 
legal, economic and socio-cultural obstacles to the persistence and expansion of 
family farming. These topics are also loosely touched upon in the parallel article by 
Bidaseca (this issue).
My focus on the obstacles to family farming should not be taken as reﬂ ecting an 
assumption that family farming would be more efﬁ cient than production in the large 
farm enterprises. The impoкtant point here is that Russian agrarian policy has shifted 
from giving precedence to private family farms in the early 1990s to prioritizing 
large farm enterprises, and moreover that this has had signiﬁ cant consequences for 
the viability of small-scale producers and the empowerment of the rural population. 
It is these consequences that will be addressed here.
Furthermore, the argument focuses on open and collective forms of protest and 
the notable absence of an emergent peasant movement. This is not to say that 
individual and more hidden forms of protest do not exist: such behaviors as gossiping, 
stealing, and footdragging,  fall into this category and are described by Scott (1985) 
as the “weapons of the weak” (see e.g. Nikulin 2003; forthcoming).
To facilitate comparison (see Bidaseca, this issue, and Visser and Bidaseca, this 
issue), this article uses the term “peasant” to describe the relatively small agricultural 
producers in Russia, whether these are private family farmers or household plot 
holders, who are mostly farm employees tending their plots in a kind of symbiotic 
relation with the large-scale farm enterprises (see below). A discussion of the various 
connotations of the term within contemporary and historical Russia is beyond the 
scope of this article, but it should be noted that the term has both negative and 
positive connotations, including for the rural population itself (see Humphrey 2002; 
Kitching 1998 on krest’ianin and fermer).
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The article is structured as follows. The ﬁ rst section provides a description of 
the regions covered and the methodology used. Second, I present a brief overview of 
the market reforms in Russia, discussing their goals and the major effects. The third 
section discusses the obstacles to the expansion of small-scale farming. I argue that 
the major obstacles to private family farm formation—which were also the major 
shortcomings of reforms—were a lack of independent institutions (here the focus is 
on legal institutions, but credit institutions, for example, are also important) and 
a lack of understanding of existing (informal) property relations and social structures 
by the Russian reformers and their Western advisors. Informal property relations 
primarily have to do with the symbiosis between large farms and household plots. 
This symbiosis had been widely discussed by Soviet-era Russian and Western 
researchers, but was insufﬁ ciently understood and taken into account by reformers 
in the early 1990s.
The fourth section will deal with the processes through which the rural, and also 
increasingly the urban, elites accumulate land and other agricultural assets. Elites 
sometimes employ illegal or semi-legal ways to accumulate property, a behavior 
which is made possible by problems with the availability and/or independence of 
institutions, discussed in the third section. The ﬁ fth section discusses the extent of 
the resistance of the rural population to accumulation by the elite, and seeks to 
explain the virtual absence of a peasant movement. The ﬁ nal section concludes by 
relating the weakness of peasant protest to insights on informal property relations 
and social structures in the Russian countryside.
THE FIELDWORK: REGIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This article is based on ﬁ eldwork that was conducted in three Russian regions 
and consisted of ethnographic research and a survey among farm enterprise managers, 
employee shareholders and private (family) farmers.
The ﬁ eldwork for this study largely took place in 2001 and 2002, with shorter 
trips of about one month each in 1999 and 2000, and further short trips in 2007 and 
2008. The survey research took place in the Pskov and Rostov oblasts (provinces), 
with ethnographic research conducted in both regions and also in the Moscow 
region.
The northwestern Pskov region, with its unfavorable conditions for agriculture, 
and the well-endowed southern Rostov region more or less represent the extremes of 
the agricultural spectrum in European Russia. Pskov oblast is part of the macro-
region of Northwest Russia, an area of insecure climatic conditions for agriculture. 
Moreover, Pskov is part of the northern non-black-earth zone, with relatively infertile 
soils. Rostov, on the other hand, is considered to be one of the country’s most 
important food-producing regions, thanks to its southern location and fertile soils. 
Despite its favorable natural endowments, agriculture in the Rostov region did not 
escape the general decline in Russian agriculture, although, compared to Pskov, the 
situation is much brighter. Moscow oblast, in Central Russia, is also part of the 
relatively infertile non-black-earth region, but due to its vicinity to the capital (with 
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high-priced demand and more investors) it is one of the major agricultural regions of 
Russia.
The survey data in this research are based on two surveys carried out during 
2001 and 2002 in Pskov and Rostov. In total, the farm enterprise survey included 
43 large farm enterprises (LFEs): 19 in Pskov and 24 in the (larger) Rostov region. 
At each LFE, two staff members were interviewed: a manager dealing with external 
contacts and a farm specialist, as well as two other employees (about their 
household plot). In addition, 44 private farmers were interviewed in these two 
regions.
Furthermore, the research consisted of additional visits (with semi-structured 
interviews) to other LFEs. The interviews and observations, by the author, normally 
took place during a single day, or on two- or three-day visits.
A case study of a successful large farm enterprise (LFE) was carried out in May-
June 2001 at an LFE in the Moscow region. During the case study, I used the 
ethnographic technique of participant observation. I stayed in a village on the 
territory of the LFE, visited the different branches of the farm enterprise, went to the 
ﬁ elds with workers or managers to observe the work process, carried out informal 
conversations and interviews with workers and staff members, and studied documents 
and accounts at the farm ofﬁ ce and the sel’sovet (village council). I was also involved 
in activities beyond work on the farm enterprise, such as occasional work on the 
household plot, having lunch in the ﬁ elds, and meetings with villagers in their 
houses.
MARKET REFORMS IN RURAL RUSSIA: GOALS AND EFFECTS
The reformers who started market reforms in agriculture in Russia and all over 
Eastern Europe in the early 1990s were strongly inﬂ uenced by the blueprint laid out 
by the World Bank, which strongly resembled neoliberal structural adjustment policies 
introduced in Latin America the 1980s.
The ﬁ rst, overarching goal of the market reforms was to improve production and 
productivity in the agricultural sector, which during the Soviet period was infamous 
for its enormous subsidies and wastage of resources and low productivity. One key 
assumption was that private ownership of land and other means of production was 
fundamental to a free market economy and was the best way to stimulate the 
entrepreneurial spirit of people. Further, it was expected that the introduction of 
a free market through liberalization of the economy, would in itself bring forth the 
most efﬁ cient producers (these were considered to be private farms) and consequently 
an increase of production and productivity.
Second, besides improving efﬁ ciency in agriculture, an important goal of the 
reforms was to provide the rural population with resources to survive the shocks of 
transition (World Bank 1992), and to increase their independence. Western advisors 
hoped that privatization would empower the population and stimulate the emergence 
of civil society and democracy in rural areas (Prosterman and Hanstad 1993:155). 
Speaking about the need to introduce private ownership, reference was made to 
universal ideals and values. In reality this meant Western values, built on the ideology 
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of enlightenment. The ownership was presented as an “enlightened” and “natural” 
human right (Kirchik 2001:1). Employees of former kolkhozes and sovkhozes and 
other villagers were given shares in farm enterprises in a largely egalitarian way. It 
was foreseen that collective farms, known for their hidden unemployment, once 
privatized would dismiss part of their employees to increase labor productivity. The 
new unemployed (and poor) then could still gain income by hiring out or selling their 
land shares back to these enterprises, and by receiving dividends on their shares in 
other enterprise assets, such as equipment. Furthermore, it was expected that 
villagers would take out their paper shares and exchange them for parcels of land and 
other assets in order to start private farms.
At the start of reform many Western observers expected or hoped that 
privatization would trigger signiﬁ cant growth of private family farms (Prosterman 
and Hanstad 1993; World Bank 1992). However, even more so than in the economy as 
a whole, formation of private enterprises proved cumbersome. While it was estimated 
that, by the end of the 1990s, about 40 percent of agricultural production would 
originate from private farms, in reality this ﬁ gure was only 4.5 percent in 2003 
(Rosstat 2004:36), and the number of private farms had even declined somewhat 
since the late 1990s, although their average size increased. Instead, agriculture is 
still dominated by the privatized successors of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. These 
large farm enterprises (LFEs), in which the employees have become shareholders, 
occupy the majority of the land and remain the major commercial producers.
The ﬁ rst goal—improving production and productivity—was not realized. On 
the contrary, in the 1990s agricultural production in Russia dropped by roughly 
40 percent and the production in the farm enterprises by as much as 65 percent. 
Labor productivity declined as the number of employees fell somewhat less than 
production. Whereas in Soviet times inputs like fertilizer were sometimes overused, 
during the 1990s there were such sharp cuts in inputs that they became paralyzing. 
I visited some enterprises where employees worked in the dark to reduce the 
electricity bill or because power was cut off for non-payment. In other cases tractor 
drivers could not harvest on time because the farm enterprise had no funds to buy 
fuel. Given such constraints, farm enterprises did not manage to produce (let alone 
buy) enough fodder for their livestock. One livestock branch manager of a farm 
enterprise in Moscow oblast described the situation in the mid-1990s as follows: 
“The cows were so badly fed that they were hardly able to walk when they were in the 
ﬁ eld. They just laid down, exhausted. Many farm enterprises did not see a way out 
and decided to slaughter large numbers of animals”.1 In addition, the stock of 
machinery declined sharply. In sum, instead of increases in efﬁ ciency, agriculture in 
the 1990s was characterized by lack of investments, de-mechanization, and sharply 
declining productivity and production.
The devaluation of the ruble in 1998 and the subsequent ﬁ nancial crisis appeared 
to be a blessing in disguise for the countryside. The import of food products dropped 
sharply, and domestic agriculture began to recover. In the early 2000s substantial 
1 The interview was conducted on May 15  2001, Moscow region.
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growth took place in the agriculture sector due to recovery in the LFEs. However, it 
should be noted that this recovery, in the main, was caused by increased production 
in a small group of proﬁ table farm enterprises, whereas large numbers of farm 
enterprises were (and still are) characterized by uneven recovery, stagnation or 
sometimes even ongoing decline (Spoor and Visser 2004). Moreover, with the rising 
value of the ruble in the early 2000s Russian agriculture was once again facing 
increasing competition from food imports, especially meat.
The second goal of the reforms, to provide the whole rural population with 
enough property rights to gain an income, thereby empowering rural dwellers, also 
proved problematic in practice, as will be shown later on. In most post-socialist 
countries the population received entitlements to former state property. In some 
countries, such as Albania, land and assets of the state and collective farms were 
physically distributed among (and restituted to) the workers, which led to 
a fragmentation of land. In Russia and other large CIS countries such as Ukraine, 
rural dwellers were given “paper” shares in farm enterprises. In the early 2000s many 
observers celebrated the alleviation of one of the last legal obstacles to the emergence 
of a real market economy in Russia, when a new land code was introduced and the 
sale of all kinds of land became legally possible. As will be discussed further on, 
interviewed farm employees rarely received compensation for their land—be it in the 
form of cash rent or as dividends on property shares—due to the dire ﬁ nancial 
situation of the farm enterprises (also see Pallot and Nefedova 2003:349).
Due to the hardship of transition, income differences rose and poverty increased 
sharply in the 1990s (EBRD 2002). In 2005, a World Bank report sketched positive 
prospects for the reduction of overall poverty, due to economic recovery, but also 
warned about deep pockets of poverty that may resist general economic improvement 
(World Bank 2005). Indeed, although an economic recovery took place in the 2000s 
in Russia and most CIS countries, inequality rose further, and the decline in poverty 
in the countryside lagged behind urban poverty reduction. In the 2000s, urban 
poverty declined at twice the rate of rural poverty, so that by 2004 poverty in Russia 
had become a largely rural problem (Gerry, Nivorozhkin, and Rigg 2007:14), with 
5.6 percent of urban dwellers being poor, compared to 20.7 percent of the rural 
population.2 The impact of the global ﬁ nancial crisis has clearly had a negative effect 
on household income, and has (one hopes temporarily) halted the overall reduction 
of poverty in Russia.
At the same time the state has largely withdrawn from social security in the 
countryside. Thus it is important to consider the relevance of the neoliberal idea, 
mentioned earlier, that the poor in these countries can be stimulated to start their 
own enterprises by providing them with entitlements to private assets such as land 
parcels and machinery (Soto 2001, World Bank 1992). 
2 Overall, from 2000 to 2004 poverty declined from 31.1% to 10.6%. Whereas urban areas saw 
a 78.6% decline, in rural areas poverty had been reduced by only 47.3%. Measurements of 
 poverty by Gerry et al  (2005:5) were constructed on the basis of a representative regional sub-
sistence food basket for a number of demographic groups, adjusted for regional price variation. 
The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey they used included nearly 53,970 respondents.
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That farm employees did not suffer from food shortages and have somehow been 
able to get by despite low wages, and widespread wage arrears in the 1990s, can only 
be understood by taking into account the informal property relations inherited from 
the Soviet era. As I will show, the survival of the rural population is due to the food 
and income generated from subsidiary household plots, a carry-over from the Soviet 
period. Yet at the same time, the legacy of Soviet-era informal property relations 
obstructs further mobilization of smallholders and resistance to accumulation of 
property by the elite.
INFORMAL PROPERTY RELATIONS: 
THE SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN SMALLHOLDINGS AND LFEs
The land reforms in Russia were based on an ideal-type conception of the Western 
farm, and upon lack of understanding of Soviet property relations, and supported by 
superﬁ cial comparisons with the successful land reforms in China and Vietnam. To 
begin with the latter, the rural situation in these countries was different from the 
one in the CIS, including Russia, in several important ways. First, collective agriculture 
in China and Vietnam was more short-lived than in the CIS, with collectivization 
starting later and de-collectivization beginning earlier. Second, the character of 
agriculture is very different. Agriculture in China and Vietnam, with a strong 
orientation on rice production, is basically labor-intensive, offering hardly any 
economies of scale. It was therefore much easier to privatize collective farms into 
small-scale farms than in the CIS, where divisibility of assets like storage and 
machinery posed a problem.
Probably the most important reason for the disappointing results of land 
reforms was the fact that post-Soviet reformers did not sufﬁ ciently take into 
account existing property relations. The blueprint for reform was based on 
a superﬁ cial observation of the Soviet farm economy, which included two opposing 
forms of production: on the one hand the state and collective farms, and on the 
other hand the small, semi-private parcels of their employees (Spoor and Visser 
2001). The productivity of Soviet collective farms hardly increased despite 
enormous subsidies and investments in machinery, while the rural population 
produced about one-ﬁ fth to one-quarter of the country’s total food on the small 
parcels, the so-called subsidiary plots or household enterprises. This fact, as well as 
the strong growth of private farms in post-socialist China and Vietnam following 
market-based agrarian reforms, was seen as evidence of the potential of private 
farming. It led to the assumption that, if the population were given access to larger 
and more secure private plots, growth would become feasible.
In reality, however, subsidiary plots did not exist in opposition to, or separate 
from, the collective, but were integrally connected to it in what has been called 
a symbiosis (e.g. Nikulin 2002; 2003). Subsidiary household plots could produce 
relatively large amounts of food because households were allowed to use a whole 
array of collective facilities, from obtaining young livestock from the collective to 
letting private cattle graze on collective pastures, using kolkhoz machinery, and 
selling their produce through the sales networks of the collectives. The boundaries 
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between the collectives and household enterprises were thus permeable (Visser 
2003b).
Although farm enterprises have been privatized, this support for the household 
plots has been largely continued. During the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s the restrictions 
on household enterprises were relaxed, and rural dwellers en masse increased their 
household production (increasing from a quarter of total food production at the 
advent of reforms to over 50 percent by the end of the 1990s), and some decrease in 
the share of households starting in 2007 due to growth of production in the farm 
enterprises.3 Farm management felt obligated to provide support for household plots 
as a compensation for meager wages. My survey among farm employees showed that 
in 2001–2 they sold 45 percent of the food produced, with income from the household 
plot accounting for nearly 40 percent of the combined income from farm wage and 
household plot.
In the early 1990s support for the plots increased, but as the ﬁ nancial situation 
in the LFEs deteriorated, farm directors were forced to reduce such support somewhat 
later on. My survey shows that, in the early 2000s, farm enterprises continued to 
provide a broad range of inputs and services (Visser 2008; 2009). Plowing of plots 
was carried out by practically all LFEs, although the cost of this service varied from 
farm to farm (and possibly from household to household). Fodder was provided by 
nearly 80 percent. Young livestock and pastures/meadows were provided by, 
respectively, 63 and 53 percent of the farm enterprises. Marketing services (mainly 
for milk) were provided by 42 percent of the enterprises, but due to increasing quality 
requirements by the processing factories, increasing numbers of farm enterprises 
stopped collecting milk from households. Currently farm enterprises rarely provide 
their households with free inputs, but they are still sold to employees below market 
prices. In the course of the 2000s, some of the proﬁ table LFEs in well-endowed 
regions paying their workers a high average wage have been able to cut cross-
subsidies to the household sector drastically (Pallot and Nefedova 2007:116–117). 
The director of a proﬁ table LFE in the Moscow oblast mentioned during a conversation 
in 2007 that his farm enterprise did not provide support to the household plots 
anymore. Many employees curtailed or completely stopped their food production on 
the household plots, as they had sufﬁ ciently high wages. Other managers of proﬁ table 
LFEs feel a moral obligation to provide such support, but under market pressures such 
support is likely to decline over time. LFEs and agroholdings from the well-endowed 
agricultural regions have also tried to lobby for legislation putting limits on the 
number of household livestock, but two proposals for such laws were rejected in the 
Duma (Twickel 2009).4
In sum, although support has declined compared with the early 1990s (very 
drastically in some of the proﬁ table LFEs), overall it is still sizeable, and membership 
3 The share of households in total production fell to 41.5% in 2008. It should also be noted that 
the share of private farmers, although remaining small, increased from 3% in 2000 to 9.2% in 
2008. Data from Rosstat: www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d02/15-02.htm.
4 At the time of the writing, in the summer of 2009, a third bill was proposed to the Duma.
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of a farm enterprise still offers beneﬁ ts to rural dwellers operating household plots. 
Households that start a private (independent) farm suddenly lose access to all these 
important beneﬁ ts and public inputs, as well as to social services (see below).
Being a farm worker also offers informal (illegal) access to farm resources. In 
the socialist period, ambiguity existed because of overlapping rights to land (Verdery 
2003). Although all land was formally owned by the communist state, and rural 
families only had use rights to their household plots, they often felt that they had 
certain entitlements to land not included in the cultivation plans of the collective 
farms, or perhaps to a small percentage of the farm harvest (or inputs). The general 
feeling among Soviet farm workers was that as the state had expropriated them or 
their forebears, all farm property was also partly their own. Currently, farm employees 
generally feel that they still have such entitlements to LFE resources (Nikulin 2003; 
Verdery 2003). Especially when the farm enterprise fails to pay decent salaries and 
dividends are non-existent, or farm management accumulates LFE resources itself, 
employees feel they have the right to take farm resources and oppose depictions of 
their survival strategies as “theft” (see also Nikulin 2002; 2003).
The tendency of rural dwellers to keep a low-paid job in the farm enterprise and 
operate a small household plot, instead of starting as an independent private farmer, 
is thus understandable once one takes into account the formal and informal access 
to resources connected to farm enterprise membership. Furthermore, the provision 
of resources for the plots increases management’s informal power over employees.
THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE LARGE FARM ENTERPRISES
Another reason for rural dwellers’ decision not to embark on private farming, and 
for their continuing dependency on farm management, has to do with the social role 
of the farm enterprise. Soviet enterprises, and especially farm enterprises, were not 
only economic units but also took care of the social welfare of their workers. In 
villages virtually all social functions were shouldered by the farm enterprise. Col-
lective farms were not just economic units but “total social institutions” (Humphrey 
1998), providing “workfare”: welfare intimately connected to work.
Russian reformers and their Western advisors have advocated transferring these 
services to municipalities so as to free the LFEs from social obligations (World Bank 
1992). It was assumed that these obligations would hinder a transformation to 
market-oriented, proﬁ t-seeking operations. However, local authorities were grossly 
underﬁ nanced, and consequently were not eager to take over this responsibility. 
Proﬁ table farm enterprises often continued to support the social infrastructure, with 
the municipality having only a coordinating function. In reality, farm enterprises 
mostly remain the centers of rural communities (Nikulin 2002; 2003; Visser 2003a; 
2003b).
Several of the proﬁ table farm enterprises I visited still built houses for their 
employees or maintained small processing units like bakeries and sausage production 
facilities for the beneﬁ t of their workers. In the Rostov oblast, one highly proﬁ table 
LFE had renovated the local hospital and also maintained a large sports complex. 
Farm directors who were able to maintain the social infrastructure were proud of it. 
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An agronomist at a successful farm enterprise in Rostov gave me a long “tour”, 
showing with enthusiasm the school, the hospital and the sports facilities (“Even the 
oblast basketball team played in this hall!”) ﬁ nanced by the LFE.5 Villagers generally 
expect farm managers to continue providing such support (Miller and Heady 2003; 
Pallot and Nefedova 2007).
The precise role of the LFE in providing social services depends on its own 
ﬁ nancial health as well as on an oblast’s wealth and, by extension, the speciﬁ c policies 
of the authorities. As the ﬁ nancial situation of most farm enterprises deteriorated 
during the 1990s, they were forced to reduce such social expenditures (see also 
Lohlein 2001; Miller 2003: 8). However, the managers of even the most unproﬁ table 
enterprises have been trying hard to maintain the most essential social services, 
such as running water, gas, and schools (see also Lohlein 2001:10; Visser 2003a). To 
sum up, the proﬁ table LFEs continue to offer a wider range of social services, and in 
some areas they have even increased spending on social services (see Kalugina 2002), 
but even weak farm enterprises continue to ﬁ nance at least the most essential social 
infrastructure.
It should be noted that the economic growth of the 2000s has recently enabled 
the authorities in some regions once again to assume full responsibility for rural social 
services. An interview with the manager of an agroholding in Krasnodar suggests that 
this is largely the case in this well-endowed region.6 As a result, this agroholding does 
not have to shoulder the social infrastructure anymore. By contrast, Nikulin’s 
(forthcoming) study of two farm enterprises in the economically depressed region of 
Perm shows an example where the authorities are still unable to take full responsibility. 
The weakest of the two LFEs has continued to manage the water supply system. The 
other farm enterprise was taken over by a rich outside investor following a bankruptcy 
in 2005, and has since been continuously enlarging the range of social services offered, 
in addition to providing support to household plots, like the other LFE.
Maintaining the social infrastructure expands the power base of the farm 
directors vis-à-vis the employees. As a director of a strong farm enterprise in Nizhnii 
Novgorod reported: “I can ﬁ re people because we build houses. If I can offer housing, 
I don’t have a problem ﬁ nding [new] workers from the area” (Miller and Heady 
2003:269). In such LFEs, farm workers who lose their job will also lose their housing 
and access to other forms of social support. It is therefore important for them to 
fulﬁ ll their tasks to maintain employment. Furthermore, farm managers can use 
housing, and social services in general, as a form of power in negotiations on labor 
and property issues. Humphrey (2002:157) presents the example of a farm director 
who “gave and took away, and sold buildings, according to her own will.” Cramon-
Taubadel (2002:182), based on his experience as an agricultural consultant in 
Ukraine, states that old-age pensioners who do not rent out their land shares to the 
farm enterprise at the price offered risk losing access to these services.
5 Visit to farm enterprise, Kagalnitskii district, Rostov region, October 25, 2002.
6 The interview with this manager took place in Amsterdam, during his visit to the Netherlands, 
on June 18, 2009.
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That social services form an important element in the power of farm directors of 
strong LFEs is especially true for the ad hoc beneﬁ ts given to farm workers individually. 
Support for individual employees, which was common in the Soviet era, has declined 
but not disappeared. Farm managers help out, for instance, by lending money for 
a welcome party when the son of an employee comes home from the army, or providing 
help when a family member becomes ill. As a farm director in Saratov said: “I am the 
head of a commune. Whether you are a farmer or a worker, you come to me. Wedding, 
funeral, a boy sent off to the army – I provide ﬁ nances for that” (Amelina 2002: 281). 
Pallot and Nefedova (2007) found that all the LFEs they visited in two districts in 
Moscow region paid for hospital treatment for sick workers and pensioners, and 
supplied meat for wedding celebrations and funerals. Farm managers are able to use 
such individual social beneﬁ ts in their negotiations with workers.
RIGHTS OF THE RURAL POPULATION AND PROPERTY 
ACCUMULATION BY THE ELITE
For rural dwellers to proﬁ t from the new property they gained through 
privatization, they need to be aware of the rights they have with regard to selling, 
renting, and otherwise transferring their land shares. Furthermore, they need to 
know how to seek support when managers or outsiders try to infringe on their 
property. It was mostly the higher educated farm specialists, having more knowledge 
about the new laws as well as the necessary social capital (Spoor and Visser 2004), 
who started their own farms (Praust 1998).
Employees who are not interested in establishing an independent farm have 
several other options for the use their land share. For example, they can use part of 
it to expand their household plot while remaining in the agricultural enterprise, or 
rent it out to the enterprise or private farms. In principle, villagers can adjust 
property use over time in response to household size and needs. However, many 
employees invested their shares in the enterprises for next to nothing, losing the 
right to their property and the annual income they would obtain from renting it out. 
About half of all the land shares that the employees received were used by agricultural 
enterprises without legal formalities for lease or investment (Uzun 1999). Mostly, 
the provision of support for household plots described earlier was presented by the 
farm directors as a compensation for the use of land shares by the farm enterprise. 
Dividends are seldom paid, as most agricultural enterprises are barely proﬁ table or 
make losses.
The promise of quick economic transformation and the creation of a “people’s 
capitalism” through privatization have proven illusory. The outcome of reform in the 
post-Soviet countryside suggests that providing the population with property rights 
in itself will not ﬁ ght poverty, contrary to what de Soto (2001) and Prosterman and 
Hanstad (1993) suggest. Property reform requires above all in-depth knowledge of 
the local extralegal property system.
As mentioned above, many farm workers as a rule have no legal contracts with 
their farm enterprises. As Gregory Feifer writes, “few landowners understand their 
legal rights. In many cases, regional and local ofﬁ cials have been able to keep land in 
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the hands of collective-farm managers and other cronies” (Feifer 2003:1). Duma 
Deputy Viktor Pokhmelkin, co-chairman of the Liberal Russia party, stated that in 
most cases where rural inhabitants tried to defend their property against farm 
managers or authorities, courts have not decided in favor of private citizens (Feifer 
2003).
In Pskov and Rostov oblasts, I came across cases where the district authorities had 
extorted land from private farmers. In Pskov region I visited one village where several 
villagers had been to court to win back the land they were entitled to from the LFE. One 
farmer had even been to court four times and, at the time of my visit, was still awaiting 
the ﬁ nal decision of the court. Even when rural inhabitants manage to win a case in 
court, this does not mean that they have “won.” In the summer of 2000 I visited 
a private farmer in Pskov whose land was illegally sequestered by the tax police. With 
the help of an NGO in the regional capital that offered legal support, he was eventually 
able to get his land back. However, in the meantime he had not been able to work the 
land for more than two years, and as a result, his exceptionally large private farm of 
about 1,000 hectares had gone bankrupt. When I visited him a year later, he had left 
agriculture highly disappointed, and had started a wood cutting ﬁ rm.
Major changes are needed to develop an independent legal system, but the 
prospects are not bright. The land code itself leaves much of the implementation of 
regulations to the discretion of regional and local authorities. In some regions, 
authorities have created extra rules which hinder the emergence of private farms. In 
the southern region of Krasnodar, aspiring private farmers must have no less than 
300 hectares of land to be allowed to start a farm, whereas the average size of private 
family farms in Russia is much lower, at 81 hectares in 2006.7 Moreover, local 
authorities have the right of ﬁ rst refusal for any land sale. The selling process is very 
cumbersome and prone to abuse (Wegren 2002b:659). Thus it is likely that the farm 
managers or rich investors will continue to be the winners of property reform. Indeed, 
“it is not difﬁ cult to imagine land committee ofﬁ cials, who are not well-paid, being 
approached (paid) to exercise the right of ﬁ rst refusal to some land deemed desirable, 
but not other land, on behalf of hidden investors” (Wegren 2002b:658). Already in 
the last years preceding the introduction of the land code, former local communist 
bureaucrats were assigning themselves plots of land in expectation of legalization by 
the land code (Nikulin 2003). The director of a farm enterprise in Rostov that I visited 
was buying up shares from farm employees. But this was a long process. He regretted 
that he had not chosen a smarter way to obtain majority ownership. He stated that 
“many farm workers stick to their shares as a memory of the past.” This description 
of farm workers’ behavior as inertia or conservatism glosses over the real interest 
that farm employees have in share ownership and the power struggles around the 
concentration of shares.
Poor rural dwellers have disproportionately lost their shares, and income 
differentials continue to increase. The chairman of the farm enterprise in Krasnodar 
even stated: “I could have made it all into my own property, but to do it one must 
7 Data from Rosstat: www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/15-09.htm
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have no conscience at all” (Nikulin 2003). Other farm directors apparently have an 
easier conscience and have managed to concentrate farm ownership in their hands 
(Dvorkin 2000). Butuzova and Kassin (2007, cited in Lerman and Shagaida 2007:22) 
describe various cases in the Kaluga region where outside investors have bought up 
shares from farm employees with the use of deception, making use of the employees’ 
limited knowledge of their rights. Pallot and Nefedova (2007:117) describe the 
practices of the MiG company taking over large enterprises in Stavropol krai, where 
shareholders in the LFEs taken over by the company
 
receive one ton of cereals per annum for their land share but “in recognition of 
the investments MiG has made in the land” they now have to pay for it.
Since the early 2000s there are increasing tendencies to further enlargement of 
farm enterprises, and concentration of shares in the hands of outside investors. 
These investors are food processors and wholesalers or ﬁ nancial-industrial groups 
owned by the so-called oligarchs. Takeover by outside investors appears to be a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, one can see mounting investments in machinery, increasing 
wages, and growing production (Rylko et al. 2005). On the other, this process is 
inseparable fromgrowing unemployment due to mechanization (Rylko et al. 2005), 
mounting rural inequality and social divides (Gollub 2008), as well as further 
disenfranchisement of farm workers (Nikulin 2005). This loss of power leads Nikulin 
(2002; 2003) to conclude that the transformation in the large farm enterprise he 
studied can better be described as a transition to a hacienda than to a holding.
THE WEAKNESS OF RESISTANCE BY THE RURAL POPULATION
It seems unlikely that uncontrolled concentration of property in the hands of 
the elites and abuse of law will diminish any time soon, unless the federal government 
makes the protection of the rights of the population a priority. However, agrarian 
policy is predominantly focused on the large farm enterprises. For example, at an 
agricultural conference in the Moscow oblast in February 2001, the Russian Minister 
of Agriculture stated that “no one should doubt the priority of large producers over 
small ones” (Wegren 2002a:28). The “national project for agriculture” which was 
started under Putin distributed most funding to the large farm enterprises, although 
some funding was set aside for private farms, and, for the ﬁ rst time, household plots. 
Within this political environment, it is not to be expected that the state will make 
small-scale agriculture and protection of individual rights a priority, unless strong 
lobbies and protests by the rural population force the government to take these 
issues seriously.
A brief comparison with Latin America may prove useful. In the Latin American 
countryside, peasant protest movements have had a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on agrarian 
policy. In Bolivia, Brazil, and elsewhere, peasant movements were able to expropriate 
large estates through occupations and road blocks (Petras 2005:3). Even in cases 
where the initial state response was negative “mass peasant pressure organized with 
urban coalitions [...] can force regimes to ﬁ nance land expropriations and agricultural 
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cooperatives, as has been the case in Brazil” (Petras 2005:3). In various Latin 
American countries, peasants have strengthened their movements through the 
creation of transnational contacts and movements, such as Via Campesino (see e.g. 
Borrras et al. 2008; Edelman 2002). It should be noted that within Latin America the 
strength of peasant movements is uneven. While in countries such as Brazil and 
Ecuador, peasant movements are engaged in long-term, large-scale struggles with 
considerable success, Argentina (like Chile and Uruguay) is at the low end of the 
scale in terms of strength of direct action by peasants (Petras 2005:11). Although in 
Argentina peasant movements have little national impact (compared with most Latin 
American countries), they have developed regional inﬂ uence in Santiago de Estero 
(where Bidaseca conducted her research) and some other provinces (Petras 2005). 
Bidaseca’s paper (this issue) presents a case where peasants in Argentina have 
successfully resisted expropriation of land by banks or creditors. In the spring of 
2008, Argentina´s major producers’ associations organized a three-week strike and 
road blocks that shook the country (Astunes 2008), although it should be mentioned 
that the agrobusiness allied itself with small farmers and played a dominant role in 
this protest against limitations on agrarian exports.
In Russia, and CIS as a whole, there is no farmer mobilization on a scale 
comparable to Argentina (let alone Brazil or Bolivia). There have been instances of 
farmer protest in Russia which managed to get media attention. In Sakhalin a farmer 
by the name of Atagishi Emeev, who operated a small farm of 30 hectares, blocked 
a road used by the oil multinational Shell/Sakhalin Energy for more than ten days to 
protest the withholding of the compensation he was promised for use of his land 
(Environment Watch 2004; Svobodnyi Sakhalin 2004). In 2005, farmer protests 
occurred in several towns in Russia, and in April 2006, farmers protested the import 
of food (especially chicken wings) in Moscow. In Ukraine, on the outskirts of Kharkiv, 
in December 1991, employees of the farm enterprise Ukrainka used their tractors to 
defend their farm’s land, which the authorities wanted to distribute as garden plots 
among the urban population (Allina-Pisano 2008:2). However, such protests have 
been few and far between compared with the large-scale protests in Argentina, which 
received widespread international attention.
There are hardly any groups that can effectively pressure the state to protect 
the rights of the rural population. In Russia, there is a single countrywide private 
(family) farmers’ association, AKKOR8, which has ofﬁ ces in 68 regions. It was 
established in 1990, when privatization started, but lost much of its support among 
farmers in the mid-1990s, when government subsidies and credits for private farms 
(which were allocated via AKKOR) declined, and the emergence of new private family 
farms stagnated.9 AKKOR lobbies the government on behalf of farmers and cooperates 
with the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, the association designed the new 
8 Assotsiatsiia krest’ianskikh (fermerskikh) khoziaistv i sel’skokhoziaistvennykh kooperativov Ros-
sii—Russian Farmers’ and Agricultural Cooperatives’ Association.
9 It should be noted that the share of private family farms in total production increased due to 
a rise in average farm sizes, but was still below 10% in 2008 (Data from Rosstat: www.gks.
ru/bgd/regl/b08_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/15-09.htm).
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government program to support private farms for 2009–11. This close engagement 
with the authorities appears to exclude more active forms of protest, such as 
demonstrations. The protection of land rights held by private farms, let alone of farm 
workers, is not a substantial part of the association’s activities.
The more recent Krest’ianskii Front (which can be translated as either Peasants’ 
Front or Farmers’ Front), was established in 2003. It is not currently an important 
actor in rural politics. The movement, which claims to have over 15,000 members in 
20 regions, is still developing. It targets a wider constituency: not only private 
farmers, but also farm workers and all kinds of small land owners. However, taking 
into account that over 17 million people have rural household plots (Rosstat 2007:16), 
and millions more urban dwellers have dacha plots, the members of Krest’ianskii Front 
constitute a tiny percentage. In contrast to AKKOR, addressing land rights issues 
through petitons and demonstrations is an important activity of the association. 
However, its staff is limited, and it has not yet succeeded in arranging a meeting with 
the Russian president.
 In sum, AKKOR is mostly focused on cooperation with the government, and its 
support among farmers has dwindled, while the more confrontational Krest’ianskii 
Front still has a long way to go to become an inﬂ uential countrywide movement.
Why does a widespread peasant movement (in potential coalition with other 
interest groups) not exist in Russia? I will discuss three important factors below.
The ﬁ rst important factor is the Soviet tradition of weak and ambivalent trade 
unions and the suppression of protest movements. Thus, Bohle and Greskovits 
(2006:7) state that “institutional and ideological legacies are a serious impediment 
to the formation of a strong labor movement in Eastern Europe.” 
Crowley and Ost (2001:219, cited in Bohle and Greskovits 2006:219) state that 
the weakness of East European labor is manifested in its “low capacity to shape 
public policy or to win material beneﬁ ts […] to organize the newly important private 
sphere [in the case of rural Russia, the family farms—O.V.], and a general decline of 
labor’s social and cultural standing.” However, several additional factors need to be 
taken into account to explain the continued quiescence of Russian (farm) workers, as 
well as private farmers, more than 15 years after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 
Russia as a whole, and generally in the FSU, there has been very limited protest by the 
population against economic reforms and economic injustice in comparison with 
Latin America (Greskovits 1998). However, rural protests have been especially 
infrequent (Javeline 2003).
In her study of payment arrears and protest in Russia, Javeline shows that 
employees in the countryside have protested wage arrears much less frequently than 
urban employees. This holds true even when controlling for the lower education and 
income levels in the countryside (Javeline 2003:143). In addition, in the 2000s the 
rural movement, like other social movements, was also largely ignored, or portrayed 
in a negative light, by the mostly state-controlled media. This, of course, makes 
outreach to potential members difﬁ cult.
Secondly, the number of private farmers and their share in production is too 
small for private farmer associations to play a role of any importance. As discussed 
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above, AKKOR’s initially broad membership declined with the drop in state subsidies 
from the mid-1990s onward. The experience of forced collectivization has made 
farmers skeptical of collective action. The majority of the private farmers I interviewed 
were not members of any association. The interviews with farmers suggest that 
cooperation among them is, as a rule, based on one-on-one exchanges, mostly on an 
ad hoc basis, and rarely involves larger numbers of farmers working together.
The third factor is demographic. In the 1990s in Russia, large numbers of young 
people left the countryside in search of better-paid jobs and more comfortable living 
conditions in the cities, attracted by growing consumerism. It should, however, be 
noted that although overall in Russia the rural population is aging, demographic 
proﬁ les vary signiﬁ cantly by region.
Due to the poor conditions for agriculture and the pull factor of nearby Saint 
Petersburg, Pskov oblast has traditionally seen strong rural ﬂ ight among young 
people. With the economic decline of the 1990s, these tendencies were aggravated. 
While the urban population in Pskov oblast dropped by nearly 10 percent from 1989 
to 2007, the rural population diminished by over a quarter (Rosstat Pskov 2007:13–
14). As a consequence, especially in the remote areas of the region, young or well-
educated employees are leaving. After a sharp decline in the 1990s, the number of 
young rural dwellers continued to drop, albeit at a lower rate. From 2000-2007 the 
number of rural dwellers aged 20 to 45 declined by 17 percent (Rosstat Pskov 
2007:19).
The demographic situation in Rostov oblast is more favourable. Unlike North-
West and Central Russia, the oblast experienced net immigration, like many regions 
in the South. These migrants are mainly ethnic Russians who left the Transcaucasus 
following the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as refugees 
from nearby parts of the North Caucasus.
As a result of the emigration of young people, an aged population remains in the 
countryside, which forms a weak base for membership, let alone leadership, of peasant 
movements (which mostly tend to consist of young and middle-aged people). Latin 
America is also experiencing rural ﬂ ight among the same age groups, but given the 
exceptionally low fertility rate in Russia, the emigration of young people has 
a stronger impact on the demographic composition of the Russian countryside.
Fourth, the nature of existing informal property relations, especially the 
importance of household plots and the symbiosis with farm enterprises, also 
contribute to the absence of peasant movements, as I will discuss in the 
conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Various obstacles to the expansion of the family farm sector have been discussed. 
The market reforms in Russia were characterized by a strong focus on creating private 
property, combined with liberalization as a way to stimulate the emergence of private 
family farms and empowering the population. It has been shown that property rights 
are only the ﬁ rst step, and do not by themselves trigger the emergence of a land 
market and institutions such as independent legal support.
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In Russia, as in Argentina, elites are accumulating land and assets as a result of 
neoliberal reforms. Although concentration of agricultural ownership is common 
around the world, the scale of concentration in Russia (and Ukraine) as well as in 
Argentina (and Brazil) is remarkable in international comparison, with single 
agroholdings operating more than 150,000 hectares (Gras n.d.:7, Rylko et al. 2005; 
Visser and Spoor 2011), although the actors and mechanisms in this process of 
accumulation are not precisely the same. Moreover, the scale of agroholdings in 
Russia is more extreme than in Argentina, as a small number of Russian holdings farm 
up to half a million or even one million hectares each.
While Western advisors expected that private property would stimulate the 
empowerment of the rural population and the emergence of civil society (Prosterman 
and Hanstad 1993), the reverse seems to be true. For the functioning of an egalitarian 
property system the emergence of an active civil society is urgently needed. However, 
the resistance of the rural population against accumulation by the elite has been 
rather weak in Russia, compared with Argentina. The legacy of 70 years of communism 
and the people’s lack of experience with protest and mobilization plays a role, but 
additional factors have been discussed. The virtual absence of protest by private 
family farmers can be explained by their small number, which makes it difﬁ cult for 
them to have any impact. Furthermore, the demographic situation in the countryside 
does not encourage the mobilization of rural dwellers, be they private farmers or 
household plot owners.
Finally, with regard to household plot holders who form the majority of the rural 
population, the relationship between household plots and large farm enterprises, as 
well as the social role of the LFEs, are crucial for understanding rural dwellers’ weak 
resistance in comparison with Argentina and Latin America at large. The plots formed 
a social safety net that protected the population against food shortages and severe 
poverty, especially during the deep crisis of the 1990s (Pallot and Nefedova 2007). 
Rural plots proved a defense against loss of earnings offering an alternative for 
meager wages in the farm enterprises. At the same time, the existence of the 
household plot also hinders the emergence of collective forms of protest. A farm 
manager interviewed in Rostov oblast stated the following regarding the reaction of 
the rural population to the negative consequences of market reforms; “In France the 
farmers take to the streets to protest, but in Russia rural dwellers remain quiet 
because they can always get by on their household plots”.10 Even farm employees 
who lose their job at the LFE can always fall back on the household plot by expanding 
production, although this means hard work and a low level of subsistence.
Moreover, the household plot holders remain dependent on LFE management for 
extra beneﬁ ts which assist the productivity of their household plots. The transfer of 
beneﬁ ts of this kind, as well as the provision of some forms of social support, have an 
informal character and depend on negotiations with farm management. Such 
paternalistic relationships hinder the emergence of protest by poor rural dwellers, let 
10 Interview with the farm manager of a farm enterprise, Miasnikovskii district, Rostov oblast, 
September 24, 2002.
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alone widespread mobilization or the development of transnational movements (see 
Visser and Bidaseca, this issue).
Rural dwellers have developed covert, individual strategies to pilfer the stores or 
ﬁ elds of the LFEs, or to conduct themselves as free riders when working at the farm 
enterprise. To some extent these could be considered forms of “hidden protest” 
(Scott 1985). However, such semi-legal or illegal strategies, in which an employee 
steals from, or tries to dodge work at the farm enterprise, comes at the cost of the 
whole labor collective (at least where the LFEs are still owned by all the employee 
shareholders). Thus they are likely to increase mutual distrust, making broader 
collective action and protest even more difﬁ cult.11
In sum, the legacy of property relations and rural social structures from the 
Soviet era (especially the household plot-LFE symbiosis and the social role of the 
LFEs), has enabled rural dwellers to survive the shocks of transition. However, at the 
same time it is also one obstacle, among others discussed earlier, to the mobilization 
of the rural population against accumulation of land by the elite, and forms one of 
the difﬁ culties surrounding any potential request that the government give more 
support to household plots and private family farms.
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